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1. Introduction
Remittances received from workers working abroad have grown at a
rapid pace over the last three decades in South Asia. In U.S. dollar terms,
remittances as a percentage of GDP during the last ten years, for example,
have risen in all countries but more dramatically in Nepal, Bangladesh and
Pakistan. Phenomenal growth of remittances in Nepal during 2000s has
raised their share in GDP to about 22 percent in 2010. Sri Lanka has
always enjoyed relatively large remittances, as a proportion of GDP.
Finally, India remains the largest recipient of remittances in the world in
monetary terms, but because of its rapid growth in GDP, its remittances
show only a modest rise relative to GDP.
Table 1: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators in South Asia, 20002010
Nepal
Pakistan Sri
Indicator
Bangladesh India
Lanka
GDP grth (%)*
GDP pc grth
(%)*
Remit/Pop ($)
2000
2010
Remit/GDP (%)
2000

5.8
4.4

7.8
6.2

3.9
1.8

4.6
2.7

5.2
4.0

15.2
78.0

12.7
46.1

4.6
115.8

7.4
55.8

62.2
199.2

4.3

2.8

2.1

1.5

7.1
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2010
10.9
3.1
21.7
5.6
8.4
Ext.Dbt/GDP
(%)
31.8
22.0
52.2
44.8
56.8
2000
24.0
18.2
28.7
31.3
41.5
2009
Other
Indicators:
6.5
6.3
6.7
8.8
10.6
Inflation (%) 1.0
3.5
1.8
-0.3
3.8
RER appr.
(%)
*: Total and per capita GDP measured in local currency.
Two interesting indicators in Table 1 that may have some relation with
remittances are home inflation and the real exchange rate of the local
currencies. Despite the fact that inflation in the global economy in general
fell during 2000s, inflation in South Asian countries have remained
moderately high in a sustained fashion and have not fallen much if at all
from the preceding decade. One question we try to address in this paper is
what role remittances play in inflation. A recent paper by Narayan et al.
(2011) finds that remittances do generate inflation in their sample of 54
developing countries. The paper claims that the effect of remittances is
even more pronounced in the long run.
The inflationary effect of remittances occurs through a change in both
aggregate demand and aggregate supply. Larger remittances increase net
foreign assets, monetary base, and money supply unless the central bank
engages in a sterilization policy to offset monetary expansion. A rise in
demand puts pressure on the prices of nontradables, and thereby on overall
price level, causing the real exchange rate to appreciate. Under fixed
exchange rates, prices go up as resources move from tradables to
nontradables. A contraction in the country’s tradables sector could cause
the currency depreciation under flexible rates, but since the exchange rate
does not move, the burden of adjustment to the shock is borne mainly by
the price level.
If a country follows the flexible exchange system on the other hand, the
increased supply of foreign currency reduces its value causing
appreciation of the home currency. The exchange rate adjusts faster
without an adequate initial adjustment in the domestic price level. The
appreciation of the nominal exchange rate boosts demand which then
raises the prices of nontradables to cause an appreciation of the real
exchange rate.
It is thus apparent that remittances (and similarly other types of inflows
of foreign money) will have an effect on both inflation and the real
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exchange rate of the home currency. We explore these dual effects of
remittances in South Asian economies.
2. The Model
2.1 Determinants of inflation:
Theoretical relationship of inflation with remittances may not run
parallel to its relation with other types of receipts of foreign exchange.
Exports result from higher levels of productive capacity and domestic
employment while remittances resemble more as a “gift” from foreign
countries. Remittances have a natural bias toward increased consumption
or consumption smoothing and toward poverty alleviation rather than
investment. This is one reason why the impact of remittances on economic
growth has been hard to determine in the literature (Barajas et al., 2009).
Thus a larger effect on aggregate demand without a concomitant increase
in domestic production tends to raise price level.
A pickup in an economy’s growth rate will dampen inflationary trend
holding any offsetting policy variables constant. We therefore control for
the growth of real GDP. Another relevant variable in a study of inflation
would be openness. Greater trade openness is likely to bring domestic
inflation closer in line with foreign inflation (Romer, 1993). Such
considerations may have less relevance for countries (such as Nepal) that
depend for their trading relations considerably on large neighbors,
particularly if inflation in these neighbors is misaligned from inflation in
the world economy as a whole.
Fiscal theory of the price level holds that the real value of an
unsustainable government debt will be forced down through inflation
(Sims 1994, Woodford 2001). While this theory has been criticized (Buiter
2002, among others), a shorter maturity of rising government debt is more
likely to be inflationary than the debt that will mature farther in future. We
control for the size of external debt as a percentage of GDP to check if a
rise in such a debt will cause inflation so that the government can reduce
the burden of its internal debt. A large and rising current account deficit
(as a percentage of GDP) that can be brought about by monetary
expansion can also lead to higher inflation according to the monetary
approach to the balance of payments.
Finally, empirical studies indicate that current inflation may depend on
past inflation because of inertia. Recent experience with inflation can
cause inflationary expectations for future under adaptive expectations.
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This is also a likely scenario for South Asia where inflation rates have
generally remained higher than the average inflation in the rest of the
world.
The theoretical considerations made above lead to the following
empirical model for inflation:

π i ,t = β 0 + β1remiti ,t + β 2 ygrthi ,t + β 3 log ei ,t + β 4trdgdpi ,t +
β 5 dbtgdpi ,t + β 6 cagdpi ,t + β 7π i ,t −1

(1)

where π = inflation, remit = worker’s remittances, grth = annual growth
of real GDP, e = nominal exchange rate (amount of foreign currency that a
unit of local currency can purchase), trdgdp = trade to GDP percentage,
dbtgdp = external debt to GDP percentage, cagdp = current account
balance as a percentage of GDP, and the subscripts i and t stand for
country and year.
2.2 Determinants of Real Exchange Rate
Relative to some high inflation economies around the developing
world, countries in South Asia have experienced moderate inflation over
the last two to three decades. A possibly more relevant candidate for the
impact of remittances in these countries may be the real exchange rate.
Real exchange rate is simply the nominal exchange rate adjusted for home
to foreign price ratio. A significant appreciation of the real exchange rate
makes the home goods more expensive relative to foreign goods,
discourages foreign demand for home goods and encourages imports. This
can lead to a significant deterioration in a country’s current account
balance and an undesirable rebalance of tradables-nontradables
production. What role do remittances play in the evolution of the real
exchange rate then becomes an empirical question.
Apart from remittances, several other factors can affect the real
exchange rate. To begin with, it needs to be emphasized that if purchasing
power parity (PPP) holds for a country, the real exchange rate will remain
stable. But most empirical studies show that PPP is seldom true in the
short to medium run and does not hold in many cases even in a longer run.
This makes identification of factors that cause deviations of the real
exchange rate from PPP an important task. Our main hypothesis is that a
greater flow of remittances will make home currency stronger in real
terms. To examine this claim, we must control for other factors that
influence real exchange rates.
The Balassa-Samuelson model, for instance, states that if a country has
higher productivity in its tradables sector than the productivity in its
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trading partners, its wages will rise causing the prices of nontraded goods,
and hence the overall price level, to go up. The real exchange rate will
therefore appreciate. This is shown by the following equation:
∆q
 ∆A ∆A * 
(2)
= s
−

q
A* 
 A
where q is the real exchange rate (price of home goods in terms of
foreign), s is the share of nontraded production in the country’s total
output, A is the productivity of labor (or in general resources) productivity,
and the asterisk shows the partner country numbers. Note that tradables
prices are determined in the world markets, hence a higher wage in the
country must raise the price of nontradables causing real exchange
appreciation. Since the national productivity figures or even those by
major sectors are not available for South Asian economies, we proxy this
variable by real GDP per capita.

The real interest rate differential is another variable with a potentially
significant effect on the real exchange rate. A high domestic interest rate
relative to foreign can attract foreign money and induce an appreciation of
RER. Similarly, terms of trade shocks, such as a significant increase in the
price of the country’s major exports could drive the RER upward.
Another important determinant of RER could be fiscal policy. If a large
budgetary expansion occurs to benefit the nontradables sector the most as
is likely to be the case for countries in South Asia, it will raise the RER.
Finally, depending on the way money received through foreign aid gets
spent, the aid variable could also have an independent influence on RER.
Thus we also control for foreign aid as a fraction of GDP in our model of
RER.
The RER model can be represented in terms of equation (3) below:
qi ,t = γ 0 + γ 0 rmtpci ,t + γ 0 prodif i ,t + γ 0 rdif i ,t + γ 0termsi ,t +

γ 0 g 2 yi ,t + γ 0 aid 2 yi ,t + ε q

(3)

where q is the real exchange rate, q=e•P/P*, where e is the nominal
exchange rate, i.e., the amount of foreign currency per unit of domestic
currency, rmtpc = remittances per capita, prodif = productivity differential
(home minus foreign), rdif = real interest rate differential (home minus
foreign), terms = terms of trade (export prices over import prices), g2y =
government expenditure as a percentage of GDP, and aid2y = foreign aid
received as a percentage of GDP.
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3. Results
Our dataset was compiled from the World Development Indicators, the
International Financial Statistics, and some country sources. We estimate
our model for Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Nepal is
dropped because of a small number of data points (16) for remittances.
Our variables are measured either as growth rates or as logarithms of
original values. The mean and median are close together and both
skewness and kurtosis are close to their values for a normal distribution.
3.1 Inflation:
Our inflation model does not perform well when tested against the
annual time series for each country separately. The growth of remittances
has a positive sign but comes out statistically insignificant in all countries
even at the 10 percent level. Real GDP growth also fails to have a
significant influence on inflation. The external debt to GDP ratio and the
trade share in GDP are also not significantly correlated with inflation. The
only factor that shows significance for one country (Pakistan) is the
current account balance whose coefficient is 0.0097 which implies that a
one percentage point increase in the current account to GDP ratio is
associated with about a one percentage point decrease in inflation.
It seems that there may be an omitted variable bias with respect to these
results. The constant term is significant for all countries except
Bangladesh. It is possible that inertial inflation while stronger in a monthly
or quarterly model can be important in an annual model as well. So we
include the one-year lagged inflation as an additional term in the last
model. However, the results continue to show a similar pattern in terms of
the direction of effects and statistical significance. Even worse is the
adjusted R2 which, except for Pakistan, is lower for all countries, and is
negative for Sri Lanka. A rise in inflation in the last period raises
Pakistan’s inflation this period by about a quarter (27 percent). In addition,
the current account balance for this country continues to have a negative
sign (with a coefficient of −0.0077) with a high statistical significance.
It is possible that remittance growth by itself may not have as direct an
effect on inflation as the growth of remittances relative to the size of the
economy. If remittances rise faster than GDP, the excess aggregate
demand could potentially pull inflation higher. We therefore replace the
remittance growth with the growth of remittances as a percent of GDP.
The new variable fails to be statistically different from zero nor does it
make any important changes in the size or significance of other
explanatory variables.
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As mentioned earlier, the size of our sample stays within 30
observations per country. By pooling observations we can raise the sample
to four times as much. Any bias resulting from country-specific features of
data can be removed by using a fixed-effects model. An FE model directly
controls for the characteristics unique to a country and prevents their
effects on the included right hand side variables. On the other hand, if
excluded country characteristics have a random element in them, the
random-effects estimation becomes more appropriate for country
intercepts.
The Hausman statistical test indicates that we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the difference between the two models is not systematic.
This means we accept the random effects model for its efficiency. This
conclusion remains valid whether or not we include the lagged inflation
term in the regressions. Yet the model without the one year lag of inflation
performs slightly better in other respects.
Further, we use the panel generalized least squares method that corrects
for autocorrelation as well as the lesser problem in our data of
heteroscedasticity. The results show that growth of remittances is
positively correlated with inflation with the coefficient significant at the 5
percent level. However, the size of the effect is not very large. Even a
doubling of remittances, holding other factors constant, is likely to lead to
an increase in the mean inflation from 8.8 percent we observe in our
sample to 11.5 percent. If remittances continue to grow by 14 percent a
year which has been the rate of growth during our sample period, inflation
rate rises by about 0.4 percentage point per year.
Furthermore, we do not find this result to be very robust. For instance,
instead of the dollar growth of remittances, if we use the growth of
remittances relative to GDP, the significance of its coefficient falls by a
large amount with the p value now rising to 20%. Overall, remittances
seem to correlate positively with inflation in South Asia although they do
not provide a dominating influence on inflation in the region.
3.2 Real Exchange Rate:
We examine both the levels and the changes in RER. We find that
remittances do not exert a statistically significant effect on the RER for
any country other than Pakistan. The sign of the remittance coefficient is
negative for Bangladesh and Sri Lanka and positive for India and Pakistan.
In the context of our relatively small samples, however, the real
exchange rates do not seem to depend either way on remittances according
to individual country data. Country-specific results also reveal that
different factors are associated with currency appreciation. In Bangladesh,
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for instance, coefficients for all the non-remittance variables are
marginally significant between 10 and 15 percent levels. Results for India
show that greater inflows of foreign aid significantly contribute to the
RER appreciation whereas in Pakistan positive terms of trade shocks
provide such an impact. These effects are as expected. However, Sri
Lanka is different from other countries in that unlike our expectations the
terms of trade shocks are inversely related and a rise in the foreign interest
rates is positively associated with the real exchange value of its home
currency.
The question of nonstationarity in the time series data can be important.
But the rather small sample for each country in our data means that the
unit root tests have low power. The conventional tests do indicate the
presence or near presence of a unit root but a definitive answer is not
available for our data. On the other hand, the series are clearly stationary
in their first differences. Hence it is possible to perform a cointegration
analysis to see dynamics of adjustment of the real exchange rates towards
their long-run values.
Once again, however, the lack of certainty about the presence of
nonstationarity leads us to favor instead the regression of a change in the
real exchange rate on changes in our explanatory variables. Such an
exercise exhibits some interesting results although remittances continue to
fail the significance test at 10 percent or better. In all countries the
domestic minus foreign productivity differential has a significantly
positive relationship with the real exchange rate. A one percent advantage
in home productivity leads to between 2 percent (Bangladesh) and 3
percent appreciation in the exchange rate. Government spending increases
raise RER in India whereas home to foreign interest rate differential
makes a significantly positive impact in Bangladesh. Other external
variables, such as terms of trade shocks or aid to GDP ratio, fail to make
any impact on RER in our model of first differences.
Panel data: To compensate for small sample from individual countries,
we turn to a panel model for our four countries based on our annual time
series. We control for the country-specific characteristics that may affect
RER, but we let the data choose the fixed-effects or the random-effects
model as a better representation of reality. The simple Hausman test shows
that differences in the coefficients for the two models are not systematic
which means we can opt for the random-effects model for its higher
efficiency. A panel GLS estimation does not, however, produce results
that are remarkably different from those of country-specific studies done
separately. Remittances seem positively correlated to RER but their
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coefficient fails the 10 percent significance test. And the variable that is
most influential continues to be the real interest rate differences.
4. Conclusion
The basic conclusion that emerges from our study is that neither
inflation nor remittances are significantly influenced by remittances
received. Anecdotal evidence does suggest that in selected cities and
villages the effects of remittances seem strong, particularly in the level of
consumption and some aspects of human capital accumulation in the
recipient households. However, without further analysis we are unable to
verify undesirable outcomes for inflation or real exchange rate in South
Asia.
This indicates that more econometric analysis may have some payoffs.
For example, we could formulate a simple recursive structure for our
model by determining inflation first which then will feed into the real
exchange rate, since RER is nothing but the nominal rate adjusted for the
price differences between a country and its trading partners.
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